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Abstract.  Multimarket  competition  abounds  in  the  real  world.  Globatization  of competition  (triad 
rivalry) and  economic integration of communities (European  integration) contribute  to the intensifi- 
cation  of multimarket  competition,  The fact  that  firms meet  in  many  markets  has implications for 
rivalry,. This paper introduces five key elements of multimarket competition and illustrates their working 
and influence by applying game-theoretic reasoning.  By way of illustration  the case of the artificial 
:~weetening industry is discussed. 
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I.  Multimarket Competition 
The key feature of multimarket competition is that inside (that is, from within the 
set of related markets) rivals  are  able  to  (relatively quickly) overcome barriers 
which  are  insurmountable  to  outside  (that  is,  from  outside  the  set  of related 
markets)  entrants  (Gorecki,  1975; Lambkin,  1988; van  Witteloostuijn  and  van 
Wegberg,  1991a).  An example of multimarket competition "is  firms competing 
against each other in different geographical markets for the same product" (Kar- 
nani and Wernerfelt, 1985, p. 87). Another case in point is substitute competition 
of rivals with products  that  are located close to  one  another in  product space. 
Multimarket competition can  be  both  actual  and potential.  The  importance of 
multimarket competition increases as the globalization  of rivalry (Porter,  1986) 
and economic integration (van Witteloostuijn and van Wegberg,  199ia)  implies 
that firms have (relatively) easy access to many markets. 
Muttimarket  competition introduces new elements into  strategy choice.  This 
paper illustrates the implications of multimarket competition for business strategy 
by developing exemplary game models. Moreover, the argument reviews relevant 
literature and puts  dispersed contributions in.to  a  unifying perspective.  Specific 
sources of inspiration are the literature on diversification (Lecraw, 1984),  integra- 
tion (Caves and Bradburd, 1988), multiproduct firms (Teece, 1982), multinational 
enterprise  (Caves,  1982),  interbrand  competition  (Scherer,  1980),  competitive 
analysis  (Porter,  1980),  transaction  costs  (Teece,  1980),  multimarket oligopo!y 
(Bulow et al., 1985) and international trade (Venables. 1990).  Since the literature 
is immense, reference is only made to exemplary contributions. 84  ARJEN VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN 
Five key features drive multimarket competition (van Witteloostuijn  and van 
Wegberg, 1991b): 
(1)  focus of rivalry (Section 2); 
(2)  economizing on entry cost (Section 3); 
(3)  multimarket spillovers (Section 4); 
(4)  reciprocal entry (Section 5); and 
(5)  multimarket collusion (Section 6). 
This paper illustrates the implications of multimarket competition for rivalry and 
business strategy by explaining the five elements (Sections II-VI) with the help 
of an exemplary set of easy-to-understand games that permit a careful expression 
of ideas that are applicable  to  real-world problems.  The rules of the game are 
non-cooperative, although cooperative outcomes can occur. For the sake of the 
argument, three simplifications are introduced. First,  different strategies are as- 
sumed to give strictly different payoffs. Second, the argument focuses on two-firm 
rivalry in  one  or  two  markets.  Third,  symmetry is  assumed  in  the  sense  that 
markets and firms are taken to be of equal size. Fourth, mixed strategy equilibria 
are ignored. Section VII illustrates multimarket competition by briefly describing 
the case of NutraSweet in the artificial sweetening industry. Section VIII concludes 
the paper by offering other real-world cases and an appraisal. 
II.  Focus of Rivalry 
1.. THREE CATEGORIES 
Competition can be associated with three categories of games which are charac- 
terized by the focus of rivalry that dominates competition: (i) actual rivalry (Sub- 
section 2.1.1); (ii) potential rivalry (Subsection 2.1.2); and (iii) entry rivalry (Sub- 
section 2.1.3).  The distinguishing characteristic of the games is the identity of the 
firms involved in competition. 
2.  ACTUAL  RIVALRY 
The incumbents against incumbents game is studied in the well-established theories 
of  (im)perfect competition without  (free)  entry  (Shapiro,  1989):  only internal 
market  conditions  determine  competition.  Actual  rivalry  drives  competition 
(Shepherd, 1984).  Table I depicts the payoff matrix of the actual rivalry game. 
Strategy denotes an action which improves the competitive position of the firm 
(for example, advertising,  R&D,  quality improvement, price decrease, capacity 
expansion, etc.). That is, L < N and L, N, R < H, since L and H imply a competi- 
tive  disadvantage  and  advantage  respectively,  whereas  both  N  and  R  assume 
(relative) parity. Three sets of outcomes can be obtained. MULTIMARKET  COMPETITION  AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 
Table I.  Actual rivalry 
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Incumbent firm 2 
Passive  Active 
strategy  strategy 
Incnmbert firm 1  Passive strategy  (N, N)  (L, H) 
Active strategy  (Ho L)  (R, R) 
N = Nonrivalry profit 
L = Leeway profit 
H  = Headstart profit 
R = Rivalry profit. 
(A)  Strategy Prisoners'  Dilemma:  L <  R <  N <  H. The non-cooperative equilib- 
rium  outcome  is  (R, R),  whereas  the  cooperative  equilibrium  outcome  is 
(N, N)  for H  +  L <  2N.  The  latter  equilibrium  does only occur if cheating 
can be precluded. The point is that both rivals prefer (N, N) to (R, R), which 
indicates a Prisoners' Dilemma. With H  +  L >  2N coordination (for instance, 
via side payments) can give the joint profit maximizing position where only 
one firm opts for the active strategy. 
(B)  Strategy preference:  L <  N <  R <  H. The dominant  equilibrium outcome is 
(R, R), where both rivals are active. A  passive strategy gives a lower payoff 
(L < N <  R). Both rivals preclude leeway by undertaking the strategy. With 
H  +  L <  2R this  is the preferred position.  Only if H  + L >  2R, selection of 
the joint profit maximizing  equilibrium  (where only one firm undertakes  an 
active strategy) cannot be obtained without coordination. 
(C)  Strategy monopoly Chicken  game:  R <  L <  N <  H.  If both firms adopt the 
active  strategy,  intense  rivalry  drops  profit  below  the  leeway  level.  Both 
(H, L)  and  (L, II)  indicate  equilibrium  positions.  This  is  a  Chicken  game 
where  the  selection of the  active  firm requires  coordination.  If R <  L <  0, 
the equilibrium is even associated with monopoly. 
An  example  of equilibrium  set  (A)  is  symmetric Bertrand  competition  without 
capacity restrictions.  In the  non-cooperative equilibrium position both rivals set 
minimum average cost prices: R = 0. The cooperative outcome follows from shar- 
ing the monopoly profit: N = M/2. Headstart and leeway occur if one firm under- 
prices  the  rival:  H  = M  and  L = 0.  A  case  in  equilibrium  set  (B)  is  duopoly 
competition  with  constructive  advertising.  If both  rivals  undertake  advertising, 
market  demand  is  increased  such  that  R >  N.  Asymmetric  advertising  attracts 
customers to the active firm: L <  H. Equilibrium set (C) corresponds, for example, 
to the  scenario where anticipation  to market  growth (by, for instance,  installing 
productive capacity) is only cost effective if undertaken by one firm. If both firms 
install  capacity and  fight for market  share,  profit is negative:  R <  0.  Both firms 
refraining  from  anticipation  gives a  normal  profit,  although  market  potential  is 
not fully exploited: R <  0 <  L <  N <  H. 86 
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T--I  T=2 
M =  Monopoly profit 
D  =  Duopoly profit 
I  =  Entry-deterring investment 
E  =  Entry cost 
Fig. 1.  Potential  rivatry. 
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3.  POTENTIAL RIVALRY 
The entry deterrence literature focuses on the incumbents against entrants game 
(Gilbert,  1989):  external  conditions  dominate  over internal  competition.  Entry- 
deterring strategies can range from investment in overcapacity and technology to 
intensive advertising and signaling devices. The key point is that potential  rivalry 
dominates competition (Bain, 1956). The natural assumption is sequential decision 
making, since the established firm can benefit from the first-mover advantage that 
is associated with incumbency. That is, in the first stage the incumbent firm decides 
on entry-deterring investment (T =  1),  whereas in the second stage the potential 
entrant  decides  on  entry  after observing  the  incumbent firm's  strategy  (T--2). 
Payoffs accrue afterwards (T =  3).  Therefore, Figure 1 summarizes the strategies 
and payoffs of the potential rivalry game in extensive form (DixiL 1982). 
An  incumbent  firm may or  may not  decide  to  undertake  an  entry-deterring 
investment (I >  0 and I =  0 respectively). In the former case the potential entrant's 
entry cost exceeds the cost of entry in the latter case (E + >  E°): the objective of MULTIMARKET COMPETITION AND BUSINESS STRATEGY  87 
an  entry-deterring investment is  to erect an  entry barrier,  which in  turn implies 
an entry cost disadvantage for the potential entrant (Stigler,  1968). The literature 
generally  assumes  the  potential  entrant's  payoff of  non-entry  to  be  zero.  So, 
D  -  E + <  D  -  E °,  D  -  I <  M  -  I  and  D  <  M.  Satisfying  a  feasibility  condition 
implies that D, M >  0.  Four sets of equilibria can be calculated. 
(D)  Blockaded entry: D  -  E ° <  0.  Entry is blockaded: irrespective of the incum- 
bent firm's strategy entry gives a negative payoff. Since of course M  -  ! <  M 
for I >  0, the equilibrium outcome is (M, 0). 
(E)  Unprofitable  entry  deterrence:  D-I<M-I<D<M  and  D-E  °>0. 
Entry  deterrence  is  not  profitable.  Therefore,  the  incumbent  firm  refrains 
from undertaking the entry-deterring investment: I  =  0. D  -  E ° >  0 gives the 
duopoly outcome (D, D  -  E°),  since entry is profitable. With M  >  2D -  E ° 
joint profit maximization requires coordination. 
(F)  Unfeasible  entry deterrence:  0 <  D  -  E + <  D  -  E °.  Even if the  incumbent 
firm  undertakes  the  investment  (I> 0),  entry  is  profitable  (D-  E+>  0): 
entry cannot be deterred. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is (D, D  -  E°). 
The incumbent firm refrains from undertaking the investment (as D  -  I <  D) 
and  both rivals share  the market.  Again,  if M  >  2D -  E ° joint profit maxi- 
mization cannot be obtained without coordination. 
(G)  Feasible  and  profitable  entry  deterrence:  D  <  M  -  I  and 
D  -  E ÷ <  0 <  D  -  E °.  With  zero  entry-deterring investment  (I =  0),  entry 
would occur (since D  -  E ° >  0). However, if the incumbent firm has invested 
in entry deterrence (I >  0), entry is unprofitable (D -  E + <  0). The equilib- 
rium outcome is (M -  I, 0), since D  <  M  -  L  As before, joint profit maximiz- 
ation (for example, M  >  M  -  I)  requires coordination. 
Equilibrium set (D) indicates monopoly with insurmountable  entry barriers (as a 
result  of,  for instance,  government protection).  The  single  incumbent  firm can 
distract monopoly profits  without  attracting  entry  (Bain,  1956).  Equilibrium  set 
(E)  corresponds,  for example,  with unsustainable  contestability (Baumol,  1982). 
Contestability  assumes  the  absence  of strategic  investment  and  zero entry cost: 
1 =  0  and  E °=  0.  Unsustainabitity  implies  that  entry  cannot  be  deterred.  An 
example of equilibrium set (F) is entry by an equally-equipped firm from a related 
market  (Cairns  and  Mahabir,  1988).  For  instance,  entry with  low  cost  from  a 
nearby  country  by  a  firm  offering  a  perfect  substitute  (Calem,  1988)  explains 
D  -  E ° >  D  -  E + >  0.  Equilibrium set (G) summarizes the literature on strategic 
investment  (Salop,  1979).  The  entry-deterring  investment  blocks  entry  which 
would otherwise occur by raising entry cost to an effective level: E ÷ ~> E °. 
4.  ENTRY RIVALRY 
The  entrants  against  entrants  game  is  explored  only  sporadically  (Nti,  1989): 
multiple  potential  entrants  have  to  coordinate  (implicitly  or  explicitly)  simulta- 
neous entry decisions. Entry rivalry may negate the force of potential competition: 88 
Table II,  Entry rivalry 
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Potential entrant 2 
Non-entry  Entry 
Potential entrant  1  Non-entry  (0, 0)  (0, S) 
Entry  (S, 0)  (B, B) 
S =  Single entry profit 
B  =  Profit if both rivals enter. 
"'the  probability of independent  entry  as well  as  the  probability of at  least one 
entry decline with the number of potential entrants"  (Nti,  1989,  p.  48). Table II 
presents the payoff matrix of the entry rivalry game. 
Rivalrous  entry  reduces  entry  profit:  B <  S.  Non-entry  yields  a  zero  payoff. 
Three  sets of equilibrium  outcomes can be identified  if simultaneity  of decision 
making is assumed. 
(H)  Blockaded entry:  S, B <  0.  Entry is blocked.  Both single  and simultaneous 
entry give a negative payoff. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is (0, 0): entry 
does not occur. 
(I)  Single  entry:  B <  0 <  S.  The  market  leaves  room  for  just  one  profitable 
entrant.  The  selection  of  the  entrant  is  not  determined.  Both  (0, S)  and 
(S, 0)  are  equilibrium  outcomes,  which  indicates  a  Chicken  Dilemma.  A 
coordination mechanism (for example, convention, deliberation or sequential 
entry) is needed to avoid insufficient or excessive entry.  Otherwise, the fear 
for loss-making entry can trigger outcome (0, 0). 
(J)  Simultaneous entry: 0 <  B <  S. Simultaneous entry is profitable. The equilib- 
rium outcome is  (B, B), where both firms decide to enter.  This equilibrium 
also maximizes joint profit if S <  2B. With S >  2B single entry (and so joint 
profit maximization)  cannot be triggered without coordination. 
Equilibrium set (H) repeats the argument underlying the blockaded entry scenario 
in the actual rivalry game.  Only a few contributions in the literature describe the 
conditions for and implications of equilibrium set (I), notably Sherman and Willett 
(1967). Equilibrium set (J) is described in models which endogenize market struc- 
ture, a well-established example being the work of Novshek and Sonnenschein on 
Cournot competition and Walrasian equilibrium (1987). 
III.  Economizing on Entry Cost 
Inside entrants can economize on resources.  An inside entrant can divert resources 
from home to entry market,  which,  on the one hand,  economizes on entry cost 
but  gives  an  (opportunity)  cost of entry  on  the  other.  Economized  entry  cost 
follow from using (excess) resources in order to supply an entry market.  Entry is 
associated with either adjustment cost in production,  if the entry market good is 
a technical substitute, or transport cost in exporting, if the product is transferred MULTIMARKET COMPETITION AND BUSINESS STRATEGY  89 
from the home base to another region or country. Entry is easy if the entry costs 
are low (Calem,  1988: p.  171).  If firms have to operate at full capacity in order 
to satisfy demand in the home market, entry gives an opportunity cost in the sense 
of home market profit foregone by withdrawing capacity from the home market 
(Bulow et al., 1985: p. 172). The entry opportunity cost is zero if excess resources 
are employed (Cairns and Mahabir, 1988) or if the resources have a public good 
character.  Intangible assets (such as knowhow, consumer goodwill and manage- 
ment skills)  have this characteristic (Teece,  1980 and  1982). The literature gen- 
erally assumes a zero opportunity cost of entry. 
In terms of game theory the opportunity to economize on entry cost introduces 
a  differentiation of the  E-term  in  Figure  1  (assuming one-sided entry).  To  be 
precise, two categories of potential rivalry games can be distinguished. A potential 
entrant from a  related market faces E/~  and E °  which gives a  related potential 
rivalry game. A  potential entrant from an unrelated market has to incur E~. and 
E °  after entry, which indicates an unrelated potential rivalry game. The key point 
is that E/~ 4  E~ and E °  :~ E°:  the payoff matrices of both games are different. 
The  difference can run both ways, depending on whether resource economizing 
entry or opportunity cost of entry dominates. Take, for example, the case where 
related entry is easier: E/~ <  E/j and E °  < E °. Comparatively speaking, the game 
of related potential rivalry favors equilibrium outcomes with beneficial conditions 
for potential entrants.  In particular, the condition that 0 <  D -  E/~ < D -  E °  is 
easier fulfilled than 0 < D  -  E//< D -  E°: with related potential rivalry entry is 
more likely to be profitable and entry deterrence is less likely to be feasible (Cairns 
and Mahabir,  1988). 
IV.  Multimarket  Spillovers 
Inside firms can exploit multimarket spillovers  -  or industry drivers (for example, 
Yip,  1989). Multimarket spillovers  are  defined as  externalities between two  or 
more markets: that is, the payoffs in market A  have an impact on the payoffs in 
market  B  and  vice  versa.  Bulow  et  al.  (1985)  distinguish supply from demand 
spillovers. The former include joint (dis)economies of scale or scope.  Operating 
in  two  or  more  markets  has  an  impact  on  the  cost  of production  and  selling. 
Vertical integration (dis)advantages are a third example (Brunner,  1961). Multi- 
market demand spillovers cover goodwill in the home market which carries over 
to the entry market (Margolis, 1989). The strategy of firms in market A influences 
the  scale  of demand  in  market  B  (and  vice  versa).  Caves  (t982)  summarizes 
spillovers in the context of multinational enterprise, whereas Teece  (1982)  lists 
multimarket externalities which diversified firms can exploit. A  key argument in 
this literature is that (excess) fungible but intangible assets can be exploited by 
multimarket operation. 
Multimarket spillovers introduce an extra profit (or loss)  from operating in (or 
entry into)  a  second  market.  Suppose  that  S  denotes  the  gain  (or  loss)  from 90  ARJEN VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN 
exploiting (or bearing)  multimarket  spillovers. The key argument  is that related 
entry gives payoff D  -  E + S, whereas unrelated  entry only yields profit D  -  E. 
Again,  this  influences  the  potential  rivalry  game  (Figure  1)  by modifying  the 
potential entrant's payoffs (assuming one-sided entry). The effect of positive multi- 
market spillovers is equivalent to the impact of entry cost economizing (negative 
multimarket  spitlovers  give  opposite  predictions).  For  example,  the  condition 
0<D-E  +<D-E  °  changes into  0<D-E  ++S<D-E  °+S,  which favors 
the  entry  strategy  if  multimarket  spillovers  are  positive  (S >  0):  the  force  of 
potential rivalry is intensified. 
V.  Reciprocal Entry 
1.  ONE-SIDED VERSUS RECIPROCAL  ENTRY 
Sections  2-4  present  games  with  one-sided  entry.  One-sided  entry  is  the  usual 
(and implicit) assumption in the literature (van Witteloostuijn, 1990a,  and 1990b). 
Calem (1988) explicitly offers two economic rationales for one-sided entry. First, 
the  incumbent  firm's  entry  cost  is  sufficiently  large  to  trigger  refraining  from 
entering  the potential  entrant's  market  (Calem,  1988:  p.  175).  Second,  legal  or 
regulatory barriers  exist which prevent incumbent firms from being potential  en- 
trant  into the rival's market  (Calem,  1988:  p.  182,  note 5).  However, one-sided 
entry is far from the only plausible case. 
Inside firms can exert a reciprocal entry threat (Porter, 1980; Calem, 1988). This 
means that firms in market A  are potential entrants into market B and vice versa. 
Three examples illustrate reciprocal entry (threats).  First,  incumbent firms in the 
entry market may decide to retaliate in the entrant's home market (Calem, 1988). 
This  strategy of counter-attack  is a  parry to the potential  entrant's  entry  attack 
(Yip, 1989). Second, Watson (1982) identifies counter-competitive strategies which 
anticipate the potential rivals' entry move: counter-competition entails actions (for 
example, entry into the potential entrants'  home market)  that force the potential 
entrant to tie resources to her home market.  Third, hostage or foothold strategies 
can  be  employed so as  to  keep  potential  entrants  in  check.  A  local subsidiary 
disciplines the  potential  entrants'  entry  ambitions  (Caves,  1982).  A  foothold in 
the potential entrants'  home market signals the ability to immediately respond to 
the potential entrants'  entry strategy by retaliation in her home market  (Karnani 
and Wernerfelt,  1985). 
2.  RECIPROCAL  ENTRY GAME 
The  key point  is  that  incumbent  firms in  a  set of related  markets  are  potential 
entrants  into  each  other's  domain.  For the  sake  of convenience,  the  argument 
focuses on the symmetric case where both (equally-sized) rivals are incumbent in MULTIMARKET COMPETITION AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 
Table III.  Reciprocal  entry 
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Potential entrant 2 
Non-entry  Entry 
Potential entrant 1  Non-entry  (M, M)  (D, M + D --- E + S) 
Entry  (M+D~-E+S,D)  (2D-E+S, 2D-E+S) 
markets of equal size. The payoff mamx of the symmetric reciprocal entry game 
is depicted in Table III. 
If none of the firms undertakes entry, both rivals earn the monopoly profit in 
their home market  (M).  If a  firm enters the rival's market,  market sharing gives 
a  duopoly profit minus  entry cost plus  multimarket  spiltover gain  (D-  E  +  S). 
The feasibility condition implies that  M  >  0.  For the  sake  of simplicity,  assume 
positive and symmetric multimarket spillovers which are, first, independent of the 
scale of operation and, second, such that 0 <  2D -  E  +  S <  M  +  D  -  E  +  S, This 
case resembles the actual rivalry game (Table I). Two sets of equilibrium outcomes 
can occur. 
(K)  Reciprocal  entry  Prisoners'  Dilemma:  D  <  2D -  E  +  S <  M  <  M  +  D  - 
E+  S.  The  non-cooperative  equilibrium  outcome  is  (2D-  E+  S, 
2D -  E  +  S), since both firms are willing to avoid the rival's one-sided entry 
(D <  2D -  E  +  S). However, the cooperative equilibrium (without side pay- 
ments)  where  both  firms  refrain  from  entry  (M,  M)  is  preferred 
(2D -  E  +  S <  M).  However, the cooperative equilibrium is only obtained if 
cheating can be precluded. 
(L)  Reciprocal  entry  preference:  D  <  M  <  2D -  E  +  S <  M  +  D  -  E  +  S.  The 
non-cooperative  equilibrium  outcome  is  reciprocal  entry  (2D-  E  +  S, 
2D -  E  +  S). This equilibrium is dominant, since M  <  2D -  E  +  S. 
Both  equilibrium  sets  (K)  and  (L)  are  studied  in  models of international  trade, 
notably Pinto (1986), Calem,  (1988) and Venabtes (1990). 
VI.  Multimarket  Collusion 
1.  MULTIMARKET CONTACT 
Multimarket  contact  among  inside  firms  facilitates  multimarket  collusion 
(Bernheim and Whinston,  1990). The outcome of multimarket competition (after, 
for example, a series of entry and reciprocal entry moves) may well be a reduction 
in competition (Caves,  1982). Edwards (1955) proposed the hypothesis that firms 
meeting  in  several  markets  recognize their  interdependence  and  therefore may 
decide  to  tune  down  competition.  Companies  with  multimarket  encounters  are 
inclined to facilitate collusion (Feinberg, 1985), since the payoff of the cooperative 
outcome  exceeds  the  competitive profit  (Kantarelis  and  Veendorp,  1988).  This 
phenomenon is also recognized in the literature on international trade (Jacquemin, 92 
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Incumbent firm 2 
P-P  A-P  A-A 
Incumbent  P  -- P  (M-  E + S,  M-  E  + S)  (M/2,  1.5M-E+S)  (0,2M-E+S) 
firm 1  A -  P  (l.5M -  E  + S,  m/2)  (m, M)  (0, M) 
A -  A  (2M- E + S, 0)  (M, O)  (0, O) 
P -  P == Peaceful strategy in both markets 
A -  P = Aggressive strategy in one market and a peaceful strategy in the other market 
A -  A = Aggressive strategy in both markets. 
1989).  For  example,  reciprocal  dumping  is  the  worst  of both  worlds  (or,  to  be 
precise, four worlds in a Prisoners' Dilemma): if both parties agree upon refraining 
from dumping, joint profit is maximized (Pinto,  1986). 
The key argument is that multimarket encounters increase the benefit from the 
cooperative outcome  (or increase  the  loss of non-cooperative rivalry). However, 
this result is only valid in the case where multimarket spillovers are not dominant. 
This  is  clear  from the  reciprocal  entry  game,  which  implies  that  both  firms  are 
potential  entrants  into  the  rival's  market.  On  the  one  hand,  if 
D  <  M  <  2D -  E  +  S <  M  +  D  -  E  +  S,  both  rivals  prefer  reciprocal  entry.  On 
the  other  hand,  with  D  <  2D -  E  +  S <  M  <  M  +  D  -  E  +  S  both rivals benefit 
from  multimarket  collusion.  In  the  latter  case  a  well-established  result  is  that 
repetition of the (reciprocal entry) game may facilitate (tacit) collusion (Friedman, 
1986). 
2.  MULTIMARKET CONTACT GAMES 
Assume infinite  repetition of the reciprocal entry game (Table III) with discount 
rate r.  Collusion gives payoff [(1 +  r)/r]M.  Defection is punished by returning  to 
the  non-cooperative equilibrium  one period  after cheating  has been undertaken. 
So,  defection  yields  profit  M  +  D  -  E  +  S +  [(2D -  E  +  S)/r].  Collusion  is  the 
equilibrium  outcome  if [(1 +  r)/r]M  >  M  +  D  -  E  +  S  +  [(2D  -  E  +  S)/r],  which 
is satisfied for r <  [(M -  D)/(D  -  E  +  S)] -  1.  This proves the intuition:  positive 
(negative) multimarket spillovers facilitate defection (collusion). 
This  conclusion  can  be  retained  if both  firms  are  already  incumbent  in  both 
markets:  both  firms  are  active  in  both  markets.  By way  of illustration  take  the 
case with Bertrand competition in both markets. Market sharing implies that both 
firms  split  the  market  in  two,  which  gives  D  =  M/2  in  the  home  market  and 
M/2  -  E  +  S  with  entry.  With  two-market collusion  this  sums up  to M  -  E  +  S. 
Defection occurs if one firm undel~rices the rival in one or both markets in order 
to appropriate monopoly profit: 1.5M -  E  +  S and 2M -  E  +  S respectively. Table 
IV presents the payoff matrix of the two-market actual rivalry game where defec- 
tion occurs first in the cheater's home market. 
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(M)  Multimarket sharing:  -E + S >  0.  The  condition that  -E + S > 0  implies 
that  entry  is  profitable.  Therefore,  the  favorable  cooperative  outcome  is 
(M -  E  + S, M -  E  + S):  the firms share both markets so as to exploit the 
dominant gain from multimarket spillovers, 
(N)  Reciprocal exit:  -E + S <  0. The preferred cooperative outcome is (M, M), 
since  entry  gives  an  extra  cost  -E + S < 0.  Equilibrium  (M, M)  implies 
reciprocal exit:  each rival specializes in the other market to the benefit of 
both firms. Both firms create their own sphere of influence. 
Both  equilibrium  sets  raise  coordination  issues.  (Tacit)  multimarket colIusion 
offers a solution if cheating can be precluded. In a repeated game punishment can 
be effectuated by returning to the zero-profit Bertrand equilibrium in both markets 
one period after cheating has occurred (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). A credible 
threat of punishment triggers the favorable cooperative outcome. 
For the sake of convenience, the Bertrand equilibrium is calculated in terms of 
profit exclusive entry cost. So, in the home market a firm earns payoff 0, whereas 
profit in the entry market equals E.  Collusion is the equilibrium outcome in the 
repeated  two-market game  if r <  1 -2E/M.  In  accordance with Bernheim and 
Whinston's (1990)  result this means that multimarket collusion occurs if the con- 
dition for single-market collusion is  satisfied.  Single market collusion gives  the 
incumbent's profit  M/2  and  the  entrant's  payoff M/2-  E.  Defection yields M 
(incumbent) or  M-  E  (entrant).  With Bertrand  punishment the collusion con- 
dition in the repeated single-market game is also r <  t  -  2E/M. 
However,  the  result  that  the  conditions for  multimarket  and  single  market 
collusion  are  equal  follows from  an  assumption  of symmetry: in  the  collusive 
equilibrium both firms capture an equal share in both markets. The game in Table 
IV assumes the opportunity to specialize: collusion implies that both firms create 
separate  spheres of influence. For example, assume the  asymmetry where both 
firms are cheapest producers in their home market. With symmetric markets, S = 
0 and E >  0 this follows immediately. Then, in a period collusion gives payoff M 
in the  home market of specialization, defection yields profit 2M-  E  over both 
markets and Bertrand punishment implies payoff E in the entry market (and 0 in 
the home base). Infinite repetition gives the collusion condition r <  1. This means 
that  multimarket  competition  has  an  independent  effect  on  collusion  if 
t  -  2E/M <  r <  1, which holds for any E >  0.  So, with asymmetry advantages in 
favor  of  incumbent  firms  multimarket  competition  may  facilitate  collusion 
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1990: 11-13)t 
VII.  The Artificial Sweetening  Industry 
The  artificial  sweetening  industry  is  an  interesting  illustration  of  multimarket 
competition  (Chemical  Week,  August  10,  1988; Financial  Post,  June  3,  1989; 
Delaware State News, May 19,  1989, Chemical Marketing Reporter, June 6,  1989; 94  ARJEN VAN WI'UFELOOSTUIJN 
New  York  Times,  November  19,  1989;  Financial  Times,  November 26  and  30, 
1990).  In  1981  the  U.S.  company  Searle  introduced  the  sweetening  aspartame 
under the name of NutraSweet. Aspartame is about 200 times as potent as sugar. 
Of the available intense sweeteners, aspartame is closest to the taste of sugar. The 
major quality of aspartame is that only fractions of a gram are required to produce 
the  same degree of sweetness as much greater  quantities  of sugar.  This  implies 
that  aspartame  brings  typically  less  than  1%  of  the  calories  of  an  equivalent 
amount of sugar. 
Aspartame  is sold as the tabletop sweetener Equal and under the brand name 
NutraSweet  as  an  ingredient  in  1700  products  including  soft  drinks,  puddings, 
dressings,  ice creams and chewing gum.  The demand from soft drinks producers 
(particularly Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola for their light versions) represent 75%  of 
sales.  NutraSweet's U.S.  market  stands for $736 million  sales in  1988.  The  U.S 
market  counts  for 90%  of the  combined  North  American  -  European  sales in 
1988.  However, Europe has the growth potential.  For example, a realistic assess- 
ment predicts a 50%  growth by the early to mid-1990s. 
NutraSweet  is  able  to  benefit  from  a  secure  and  extremely  profitable  home 
market, since in the U.S. NutraSweet's aspartame  (carrying the companies name) 
is  patented  up  until  1992.  NutraSweet's  1988-profit  was  close  to  $330  million. 
During  the  period  1986-1987  the  European  patents  expired,  however.  So,  the 
U.S. market and European market show(ed) blockaded entry in the period 1981- 
1992  and  1981-1986/1987,  respectively: NutraSweet's point of departure  is  pro- 
tected  monopoly  (equilibrium  set  (D)).  In  defence  of this  lucrative  monopoly 
position  NutraSweet  started  to  erect  strategic  barriers  to  entry  in  light  of the 
European patent expiration: the company's objective was to trigger effective entry 
deterrence (equilibrium set (G)). 
Two entry-deterring  strategies worth mentioning  are exclusive contracting  and 
branding the ingredient.  First,  NutraSweet exploited his bargaining position as a 
monopolist by negotiating  long-term  contracts with large  customers (particularly 
Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola): for example, NutraSweet guarded 60%  of the Canad- 
ian market by signing exclusive contracts with Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. and T.C.C. 
Beverages Ltd.,  the Canadian  bottler of Coca Cola.  Second, NutraSweet forced 
his customers to put the company's logo on soft-drink cans, which made the mere 
ingredient  aspartame into a household name NutraSweet. 
Notwithstanding  NutraSweet's  entry-deterring  strategies  potential  competitors 
started  preparing  entry  into  the  European  market  after  the  expiration  of  the 
patents.  In particular,  the  Irish company Angus Fine  Chemicals  (AFC)  and the 
Dutch-Japanese joint venture Holland Sweetener Company (HSC) installed  pro- 
ductive capacity up-front by making use of an innovative cost-reducing technology 
hoping to trigger a profitable market sharing arrangement  in Europe (equilibrium 
set  (F)).  HSC,  for example,  appears  to have  a  good hand  as  the joint  venture 
could benefit from resource economizing entry (ER < Eu) and multimarket spill- 
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management  skills,  knowledge  of European  markets,  R&D  knowhow,  financial 
resources and goodwill). Both parties in the joint venture -  the chemical companies 
DSM and Tosoh -  were engaged in horizontal diversification into a related market 
by broadening their product line. 
After the expiration of his European patents NutraSweet counterattacked  both 
entrants AFC and HSC in their European home market by an aggressive strategy 
which  reduced  price  to  half  the  American  level:  the  price  in  the  U.S.  market 
ranged from $55 to $90 a pound in 1989, whereas the European level dropped to 
$27.  NutraSweet's retaliation strategy of intense post-entry competition in Europe 
was partly successful as AFC decided to exit the market: AFC appeared to be the 
weak player in  the  Chicken  game  (equilibrium  set  (C)).  However, up  until  the 
present day HSC has been able to keep up the fight. Probably, NutraSweet's post- 
entry strategy implies that,  cewris paribus, the market only leaves room for single 
entry (equilibrium set (I)). 
HSC's  response  to  NutraSweet's  aggressiveness  was  twofold.  First,  the  firm 
attacked and attacks NutraSweet's entry-deterring practices (charge: anticompeti- 
tive contracting)  and post-entry strategy  (charge:  below-cost dumping)  in  Euro- 
pean  courts.  The  European  Commission  has  declared  valid  HSC's  charge  that 
NutraSweet's exclusive contracting strategy is illegitimate:  the contracts had to be 
dissolved. Recently, the European Commission has, moreover, decided to impose 
stiff anti-dumping  duties (27.55 Ecu per kilo) on NutraSweet's aspartame so as to 
compensate for the firm's low European prices. The combination of NutraSweet's 
entry-deterring  and retaliation  strategies and  HSC's aggressive response in court 
induces  toughness in the  European  market  (equilibrium  set  (A)).  Second,  HSC 
attempted  and  attempts  to undertake  reciprocal entry by penetrating  the North- 
American market so as to break down NutraSweet's one-sided entry strategy. 
On  the  one  hand,  HSC  has  gained  a  3%  Canadian  market  share  worth 
$875,000  in  t989  (by selling  to,  for  example,  soft-drinks  producer  Schweppes) 
since NutraSweet's Canadian  patent expired in  1987.  Recently, HSC won a  case 
against  NutraSweet's  exclusive  contracting  practice  in  Canadian  court.  On  the 
other hand, HSC brought NutraSweet to court in the latter's home state Delaware. 
With the purpose to provoke a trial regarding NutraSweet~s patents HSC located 
an  American  subsidiary in  Delaware.  HSC  announced  the  intention  to  bring  a 
tabletop  Sweetmatch  (a  perfect  substitute  for NutraSweet's  Equal)  to  the  U.S. 
market. The expectation is that the procedure will take several years. NutraSweet 
has accepted HSC's challenge by, for example, announcing  an intense promotion 
campaign and the buildup of productive capacity in Europe. Clearly, NutraSweet's 
moves in Europe and HSC's countermoves in North America are an example of 
a reciprocal entry game (equilibrium set (K) or (L)). 
The  outcome of the  battle  in  the  artificial  sweetening  market  is  a  matter  of 
guessing.  The  case clearly illustrates  multimarket  competition.  Although  Nutra- 
Sweet's objective is to return to the pre-entry monopoly position (equilibrium set 
(G)) by forcing HSC to exit the aspartame market, multimarket contact may well 96  ARJEN VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN 
trigger  (tacit)  collusion.  Multimarket  cooperation  can  take  the  form  of either 
multimarket sharing  (equilibrium set (M)), both rivals signing a peace agreement 
in North America and Europe, or reciprocal exit (equilibrium set (N)), both firms 
creating  their  own spheres of influence  (probably NutraSweet in North  America 
and  HSC  in  Europe).  Anyway,  HSC  clearly  intends  to  stay  in  the  market:  K. 
Dooley, vice president of HSC's Canadian  subsidiary,  said that  "his company is 
committed to a long battle and is confident the preference of beverage makers for 
a  second source  of supply will  eventually give them  a  competitive  share  of the 
market"  (Financial Post, June 3,  1989). 
VIII.  Appraisal 
The relevance of multimarket competition is increasing  as a result of the globaliz- 
ation  of rivalry  and  economic  integration  of regions.  Multimarket  competition 
identifies five elements that are important while deciding on strategy in an environ- 
ment  where  related  firms  are  engaged  in  rivalry:  (1)  focus of competition,  (2) 
economizing on entry cost, (3) multimarket spillovers, (4) reciprocal entry and (5) 
multimarket  collusion.  Game  theory  can  be  applied  to  clarify the  working  and 
implications  of (the  five elements  of)  multimarket  competition.  The  case of the 
battle for the aspartame market as well as the other real-world examples referred 
to  below  illustrate  this.  The  framework  of multimarket  competition  integrates 
theories of industrial  organization  and strategic management  and may serve as a 
good starting  point  for future  research  in  this  area.  By way of appraisal,  three 
remarks  can conclude the argument. 
Firstly,  the  applicability of the multimarket  framework is not restricted to the 
market for aspartame. Space limitations dictate that, by way of illustration, hinting 
at three examples of reciprocal entry must suffice. First,  Goodyear responded to 
Michelin's entry into the U.S. tyre market with the help of a counterattack in the 
latter's  European  home  market  (Karnani  and  Wernerfelt,  1985).  In  the  1970s 
Michelin invented the radial tyre technology. Backed by this innovation Michelin 
challenged  Goodyear in  the  latter's  U.S.  home  market.  By  1980  Michelin  had 
captured an 8% market share in the U.S. Goodyear reacted initially in Michetin's 
home  market,  Europe,  by increasing  his  market  share  from 8%  to  12%  in  less 
than  a  year,  while  simultaneously  making  an  effort to catch  up  with  Michelin's 
radial  tyre  technology.  Second,  Eastman  Kodak  replied  to  Fuji  Photo  Film's 
challenge  in the  U.S.  by penetrating,  after a  year-long lag,  the latter's Japanese 
home market (The Economist,  November 10,  1990). In the 1980s Fuji successfully 
invaded the American (and European)  markets where Kodak had dominated for 
decades.  Kodak initially responded by cost-reducing efforts in his home markets. 
However, by 1984 the trade barriers that protected the Japanese film market were 
dismantled,  which  enabled  Kodak  to  enter  into  Fuji's  home  market.  By  1990 MULTIMARKET COMPETITION AND BUSINESS STRATEGY  97 
Kodak's sales had  grown sixfold to a  15%  market share.  Third,  American  com- 
puter firms invaded Japan after Japanese rivals moved into the U.S. in the second 
half of the 1980s (Wall Street Journal Europe,  JuDy 18,  1991).  Japanese companies 
(notably NEC,  Epson and Toshiba)  increased their share in the U.S.  market for 
personal computers from almost zero in the mid-1980s to 10%  in 1990.  Recently, 
U.S.  computer firms  (particularly  IBM, Apple and Compaq) started  to counter- 
attack their Japanese rivals in their home market by exploiting improved technol- 
ogy  and  consumer  acceptance.  Apple's  strategy,  for  example,  already  showed 
success, as halfway 1991 sales were 60%  above the 1990-Ievels, implying a doubled 
market share  (from close to 2.5%  to 5%). 
Secondly,  an  additional  element  emerges in  the  NutraSweet  case:  the  role  of 
(patent-protected)  innovation.  This  element  is  not  contradictory  to  the  paper's 
theoretical argument.  NutraSweet's patent-protected monopoly in the first half of 
1980s impeded the functioning of multimarket competition. The expiration of the 
patents  plus  the  efficiency-enhancing  innovation  of potential  rivals  did  trigger 
multimarket  competition  in  the  second  half  of the  1980s,  however.  From  then 
on  the  theory  is  applicable.  A  potential  rival's  innovation  induces  multimarket 
competition  by making  entry easier.  The  dynamic nature  of multimarket  has  to 
be emphasized:  it is probably fair to say that changes in the status quo are caused 
by shifts in one of the elements of multimarket competition that affect the easiness 
of entry  for either  potential  rivals  (initial  entry)  or challenged  incumbent  firms 
(reciprocal  entry).  It  is  here  where  the  crucial  role  of innovation,  for example, 
enters  in  the  cases  of the  aspartame  and  tyre  markets  by making  initial  entry 
easier for potential rivals (HSC and Michelin, respectively). In the photo film and 
personal  computer  markets  reciprocal  entry  (from  the  U.S.  to  Japan)  became 
easier  for the  attacked  American  incumbents  (Kodak  and  IBM-Apple-Compaq, 
respectively)  as  a  result  of dismantled  trade  barriers  and  improved  technology, 
respectively. 
Thirdly,  the argument  in this paper is based on restrictive assumptions on the 
number  of firms  (two duopolists)  and  market  parity  (symmetric demand  sched- 
ules).  The assumptions may not be so restrictive as they seem to be at first sight, 
however. The restriction to the duopoly case with symmetric markets may not be 
essential, To date, the qualitative results of the duopoly argument stand up against 
extensions to the n-firm case,  and the same holds for generalizations  to a setting 
with  asymmetric  markets:  qualitatively,  the  elements  that  play  a  major  role  in 
multimarket competition seem to be robust to changes in the number of firms and 
(a)symmetries  of markets.  For example,  first investigations  in  the  literatures  on 
international  intra-industry  trade  (Venables,  1985)  and  multimarket  collusion 
(Bernheim  and  Whinston,  1990)  suggest that  results  for n-firm  competition  and 
asymmetric  markets  are  qualitatively  equivalent  to  the  patterns  that  occur  in 
symmetric  duopoly cases.  However,  this  observation  leaves  unchallenged  that, 
where  this  paper  offers  useful benchmark  propositions,  future  research  can  be 
directed to an investigation into the robustness of the framework explained above. 98  ARJEN VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN 
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* Professor  H.W,  de  Jong  and  M,  van  Wegberg  are  gratefully  acknowledged  for  their  valuable 
comments. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies. 
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